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Ethnicity and Con!ict: An Empirical Study†
By Joan Esteban, Laura Mayoral, and Debraj Ray*
We examine empirically the impact of ethnic divisions on con!ict, by 
using a speci"cation based on Esteban and Ray (2011). That theory 
links con!ict intensity to three indices of ethnic distribution: polar-
ization, fractionalization, and the Gini-Greenberg index. The empiri-
cal analysis veri"es that these distributional measures are signi"cant 
correlates of con!ict. These effects persist as we introduce country-
speci"c measures of group cohesion and of the importance of public 
goods, and combine them with the distributional measures exactly as 
described by the theory. (JEL D63, D74, J15, O15, O17)
This paper examines the link between measures of ethnic distribution and social 
con.ict.
The in.uence of the Marxian paradigm is clearly seen in the traditional view that 
income or wealth inequality is a major potential cause of con.ict. Early empiri-
cal studies emphasized indicators of income or wealth distribution as possible cor-
relates of con.ict (see, e.g., Brockett 1992; Midlarski 1988; Muller and Seligson 
1987; Muller et al. 1989; and Nagel 1974, among several others). As the survey 
article by Lichbach (1989) concludes, however, the results obtained were generally 
ambiguous, or statistically insigni/cant.
The emphasis on inequality as a driver of con.ict is natural, in the sense that the 
poor might be reasonably expected to harbor strong antagonisms against the rich. 
Yet the existence of antagonisms is only part of the story. The prevalence of sus-
tained con.ict requires those antagonisms to be channeled into organized action, 
often a tall order when economic strengths are so disparate. The clear economic 
demarcation across classes is a two-edged sword: while it breeds resentment, the 
very poverty of the have-nots militates against a successful insurrection, and even 
then the different skill and occupational niches occupied by capitalist and worker 
makes effective redistribution across classes a more indirect and dif/cult prospect.
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In contrast, noneconomic markers separate individuals who are economically sim-
ilar. The gains from such con.ict are immediate: the losing group can be excluded 
from the sector in which it directly competes with the winners.1 This leads to a 
different view of social con.ict. It could emanate from economic motivations, but 
/nd its expression through the cleavages generated by religion, ethnicity, or national 
origins. It could be further exacerbated by hatreds and resentments—perhaps pri-
mordial, perhaps owing to a history of violence—that are attached to the markers 
themselves. This is why scholars such as Brubaker and Laitin (1998), examining 
the history of internal con.icts in the second half of the twentieth century, are led to 
remark on “the eclipse of the left-right ideological axis” (p. 424) and the “marked 
ethnicization of violent challenger-incumbent contests” (p. 425).
That raises the empirical question: do ethnic divisions matter for con.ict? In part, 
the answer must depend on what is meant by an ethnic “division.” A popular candi-
date is the well-known fractionalization index. It is used as an independent variable in 
empirical studies on con.ict; see, e.g., Collier and Hoef.er (2004), Fearon and Laitin 
(2003a), and Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004).2 But the empirical connection 
between fractionalization and con.ict is missing or at best weak. Fearon and Laitin 
(2003a, p. 82) conclude that the observed “pattern is thus inconsistent with … the 
common expectation that ethnic diversity is a major and direct cause of civil violence.”
Of course, there is no reason to expect a connection in the /rst place, even if we 
believe that ethnic “divisions” cause con.ict. There is no foundation for the assertion 
that fractionalization captures those divisions. It is a measure taken off the shelf, one 
that happens to yield the expected results for economic growth or public good pro-
vision. An alternative approach is pursued by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
(hereafter, MRQ), who conduct the /rst empirical study relating con.ict to ethnic 
polarization, drawing on the earlier theoretical work of Esteban and Ray (1994, 
1999).3 Their contribution is important: it provides serious econometric support for 
the proposition that “deep cleavages” along large group lines might affect con.ict.4
Our main contention in this paper is that we cannot begin to understand the connec-
tions between ethnic divisions and con.ict unless we have conceptual arguments that 
tell us (i) what the relevant notion of a “division” should be, and (ii) how such a notion 
might be sensitive to the underlying nature of the con.ict. Theory can and should 
inform our empirical speci/cations. As we will argue, a fundamentally important dis-
tinction must be drawn between a con.ict that is over “public goods”—ideological or 
religious supremacy, or political power—and one that is over private goods, such as the 
capture of oil resources or mining revenues. We draw on Esteban and Ray (2011), who 
develop a theory of con.ict across groups with different levels of cohesion, allowing 
1 In addition, within-group economic disparities allow the complementary activities of con.ict funding and con-
.ict participation to take place. Esteban and Ray (2008a) base a theory of ethnic salience in con.ict on this premise.
2 See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an extensive survey that discusses these papers and related literature.
3 Measures of polarization were developed independently by Esteban and Ray (1994) and Wolfson (1994). The 
measure MRQ use can be viewed as a special case of the one we deploy in this paper. It presumes that all intergroup 
distances are “binary.” In contrast, we will draw in detail on alternative measures of intergroup distances. Fearon (2003a) has already made the point that ethnolinguistic distances may potentially play a role in explaining ethnic 
con.ict and computed a measure based on dissimilarity between pairs of languages. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and 
Wacziarg (2012) examine this point in a different context, by studying the level of social transfers in ethnically het-
erogeneous societies. They /nd that the measures that include variation in distances outperform the ones that don’t.
4 Recall Horowitz (1985, p. 39): “A centrally focused system [with few groupings] possesses fewer cleavages 
than a dispersed system, but those it possesses run through the whole society and are of greater magnitude.”
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for such “public” and “private” prizes as well as different mixes of those prizes. We 
review their approach brie.y in Section I. They show that the equilibrium intensity of 
con.ict is linearly related to just three measures of distribution and no other: polariza-
tion (P), fractionalization (F), and a Greenberg-Gini index of ethnic difference (G), all 
to be formally de/ned below (see Proposition 1). Moreover, the model tells us that the 
weight of each of these indices in explaining con.ict intensity depends on the particu-
lar nature of each con.ict. Speci/cally, ethnic polarization will in.uence con.ict if the 
prize is public and group cohesion is high, and ethnic fractionalization will in.uence 
con.ict if the prize is private (and group cohesion, once again, is high). Finally, the 
Greenberg-Gini difference index becomes relatively important in explaining con.ict 
if group cohesion is low.
The purpose of the current paper is to bring these theoretical predictions to the 
data. We study 138 countries over 1960–2008. We begin by implementing the idea 
that the equilibrium level of con.ict is linked to the three distributional measures 
identi/ed above. Across a variety of speci/cations and robustness checks (described 
in Tables 1–8), the ethnic polarization measure is highly signi/cant and positive, 
the effect of fractionalization is equally large and positive, though somewhat less 
signi/cant, and the Greenberg-Gini, while signi/cant, affects con.ict negatively. 
The fact that polarization is strongly signi/cant suggests that disputes over public 
goods, broadly de/ned, is an important feature of social con.icts. Such public goods 
could be narrowly economic, such as access to a particular trade or a labor market, 
or they could represent political power or cultural dominance, or plain animosity. 
The fact that fractionalization is signi/cant as well suggests that divisible pecuniary 
bene/ts also play a role in con.ict. Finally, the importance of polarization and frac-
tionalization, and the fact that G enters negatively, can together be interpreted, using 
the theory, as an indicator that within-group cohesion in the contribution of con.ict 
resources is particularly high in situations of open con.ict.
Recall that the relative importance of P and F in explaining con.ict depends on the 
extent to which payoffs are public rather than private. The previous exercise implicitly 
assumes that this composition is the same across countries. In the remainder of the 
paper, we take the analysis a step forward by constructing proxies for country-speci/c 
values of relative publicness from ancillary data. To do so, we employ indicators for 
privateness or publicness of the prize that vary across countries. We capture private-
ness by oil reserves, and publicness by different measures of autocracy (see Section V 
for more details). With these two sets of indicators we construct an index of relative 
publicness Λ. We use the structure of Proposition 1 to create the variables P × Λ 
and F × (1 − Λ). These variables test for the ideas that the impact of polarization is 
heightened by relative publicness Λ, while that of fractionalization is enhanced by 
relative privateness 1 − Λ. Our second main result is that these assertions (see the /rst 
three columns of Table 9) are supported to a remarkable degree.
In the foregoing analysis, we continued to assume that the level of within-group 
cohesion is the same across the countries in our sample. In a last step that exploits 
fully the structure of the theory, we use indicators from the World Values Survey to 
estimate group cohesion by country, and then enter all these variables into the regres-
sion exactly as speci/ed by the model. This permits sharper tests that rely even more 
deeply on the structure of the model. Once again, we invoke Proposition 1 to inform 
the empirical speci/cation, and once again our results are strongly supportive of the 
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theory; see the last three columns of Table 9. The three steps imply increasing faith 
in the logical structure of the model. We do not take a particular stand on this issue, 
and leave it to the reader to decide which approach (if any) she /nds most convincing.
Section I summarizes the theory. Section II describes the data. Baseline empirical 
results are presented in Section III, while Section IV examines robustness along sev-
eral dimensions. Section V extends the analysis to allow for intercountry variations 
in relative publicness and cohesion. Section VI concludes.
I. Theory
The background for this paper is Esteban and Ray (2011) (hereafter, ER). ER 
describe a theory of con.ict incidence in which distributional measures play a cen-
tral role.5 There are m groups engaged in con.ict, with Ni the number of individuals 
in group i, and N the total population. The winner enjoys two sorts of prizes: one is 
private and therefore excludable, and the other is public.
Examples of private payoffs include administrative or political positions, spe-
ci/c tax breaks, bias in the allocation of public expenditure and infrastructures, 
or access to rents from natural resources. Privateness has two properties. First, the 
prize is divided among the winning group, so group size matters (Olson 1971). 
Second, the identity of the winner is irrelevant to the losers.6 Let $ be the per capita 
value of the private prize at stake.
In most con.icts, victory also yields a prize that is public in nature: its enjoyment is 
independent of the population size. This includes political power, control over policy, 
cultural values, religious dominance, and so on. The (population-normalized) mag-
nitude of such public payoffs—call it pi—must depend on the extent to which exist-
ing institutions permit the group in power to impose policies or values on the rest of 
society. In general, other groups will derive payoffs from these choices, depending on 
“how far” they are from the winner. Say that a member of group i enjoys payoff uij pi if 
the ideal policy of group j is chosen. This induces a notion of “distance” across i and j: 
dij ≡ uii − uij , so that the per capita loss to i from j ’s ideal policy is just pidij.
Individuals in each group expend resources r (time, effort, risk) to in.uence the 
/nal outcome. Write the income equivalent cost to such expenditure as c(r) and 
assume that c is increasing, smooth, and strictly convex, with c′ (0) = 0. Add indi-
vidual contributions in group i to obtain group contribution Ri. We presume that the 
probability of success for group i is given by pi = Ri/RN , where RN ≡  ∑ i   R i.7 We 
denote by ρ ≡ RN/N the per capita value of the resources expended in con.ict.
The payoff, then, to a person in group i who expends resources r is given by 
(1) piuii + pi  $ _ ni −  ∑ j=1
m
 p j pidij − c(r),
where ni ≡ Ni/N is the population share of group i.
5 It is simply presumed that society is in a state of (greater or lesser) turmoil. For explicit models of the decision 
to enter into con!ict, see Esteban and Ray (2008a, b) and Ray (2009).
6 To be sure, there could be differential degrees of resentment over the identity of the winner. Simply include this 
component under the public type of the two prizes.
7 If RN = 0, use an arbitrary allocation of win probabilities.
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Close the model by presuming that every individual has an “extended utility func-
tion” (as in Sen 1966) that places weight 1 on personal payoffs, described in equa-
tion (1), and weight α on the aggregate of all payoffs for other group members. As ER 
observe, the weight α could be altruism, or some measure of the extent to which group 
monitoring, possibly with promises and threats, overcomes the usual free-rider prob-
lem. Indeed, α could exceed 1, the latter being the weight placed on the individual.
The main theoretical proposition to follow is based on three measures of eth-
nic divisions that are all based on the same underlying parameters: the population 
shares ni of each group, as well as the intergroup distances dij just de/ned. First, we 
introduce a measure of polarization based on Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) and 
Esteban and Ray (2011):
 P =  ∑ 
i=1
m
  ∑ 
j=1
m
  n i 
2 nj dij .
Next, we de/ne the Greenberg-Gini index as 
 G =  ∑ 
i=1
m
  ∑ 
j=1
m
 ni nj dij .
The distinction between P and G is super/cial at /rst sight but it is of great concep-
tual importance. The squaring of population shares in P forces group sizes to matter 
over and above the mere counting of individual heads implicit in G.
Our last measure is ethnic fractionalization, which discards the intergroup dis-
tances from the Gini-Greenberg and replaces them with 0–1 variables: 
 F =  ∑ 
i=1
m
  ∑ 
j≠1
m
 ni nj =  ∑ 
i=1
m
  n i (1 − ni).
We can now state
PROPOSITION 1 (Esteban and Ray 2011): Equilibrium per capita con!ict ρ is 
approximately determined as follows: 
(2) σ ≃ α[λP + (1 − λ)F ] + λ(1 − α)  G _N  +  
(1 − λ)(1 − α)(m − 1)   __ N ,
where σ ≡  c′ (ρ)ρ _pi + $  is a measure of the intensity of con!ict and λ ≡ pi/(pi + $) is the 
relative publicness of the prize. 
The sense in which this result is an “approximation” is discussed in ER, and we 
omit that discussion here. In what follows, we describe equation (2) more carefully.
First interpret σ. The numerator is the income equivalent cost of the per capita level 
of resources employed in con.ict, evaluated at the “shadow price” of these resources, 
c′ (ρ) (the marginal rate of substitution of effort for income). In the denominator we 
have the total per capita value of the stakes. Thus, σ represents the ratio of the value of 
the waste (or con.ict) to the value of the potential bene/ts from con.ict.
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We now describe the right-hand side of equation (2). The equilibrium level of con-
.ict intensity depends on the exogenous data of the model: individual preferences, 
group size, nature and size of the prize, and level of group cohesion. Equation (2) 
tells us that all this information must be combined in a special way. In particular, 
it suf/ces to aggregate all the information on preferences and group sizes into just 
three indices—P, F, and G/N—with the weights on the three distributional measures 
depending on the composition of the prize and on the level of group commitment. The 
publicness of the prize reinforces the effect of polarization, the privateness of the prize 
reinforces the effect of fractionalization, while high group cohesion enhances both 
measures and simultaneously diminishes the effect of G/N. ER discuss these effects 
in detail.
II. Empirical Implementation: Data and Conceptual Issues
We study 138 countries over 1960–2008. The time period is divided into 5-year 
subperiods for a total of 1,125 observations (in most cases).8 We start by considering 
several indicators for the intensity of con.ict and then we deal with the measurement 
of group size and intergroup distances needed to compute the distributional indices. 
The discussion of the measurement of the degree of publicness of the prize and of 
the level of group commitment is postponed to Section V, when they will play a 
role in our analysis. The Appendix contains detailed descriptions of all the variables 
employed in the empirical analysis, as well as summary statistics pertaining to them.
A. Con!ict
We measure intensity of con.ict on the basis of the death toll. We use data on 
battle deaths from the UCDP/PRIO dataset.9 Ideally we would like to have informa-
tion on the total number of deaths per year as a proper indicator for the intensity of 
con.ict as captured in the ER model presented in Section I. Unfortunately, available 
information is quite limited and unreliable. This has led to the convention of mea-
suring con.ict by a binary variable. The PRIO dataset offers a yearly binary indica-
tor of whether there is con.ict or peace based on three threshold levels depending 
on the number of deaths: “low” (prio25), “intermediate” (priocw), and “war” 
(prio1000).10 In the current exercise, a country is recorded as having experienced a 
con.ict incidence at some level in a given period if, in any of the years within that 
period, the corresponding threshold condition has been met.11
We take as our baseline prio25, which reports all con.icts with 25 or more battle 
deaths in a year. Higher thresholds remove the small—and intermediate—con.ict 
8 The last subdivision, 2005–2008, contains only four years.
9 This is a joint dataset of the Uppsala Con.ict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Con.ict 
Research, Uppsala University, and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO). It is available at http://www.prio.no/Data/. See Gleditsch et al. (2002) for a presentation of 
the dataset and the relevant de/nitions. Correlates of War (COW) is an alternative dataset. It has been used by Doyle 
and Sambanis (2003), Collier and Hoe.ler (2002), and Fearon and Laitin (2003a).
10 PRIO considers a country to be in a state of con.ict when one of the warring parties is the incumbent govern-
ment and the number of battle-related casualties goes beyond a threshold, as described in the main text.
11 We note with some misgivings that the PRIO thresholds are not normalized by the population of the country 
in question, which undoubtedly biases civil wars in favor of large countries. The population control in our exercises 
should take care of this problem.
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events that the model also seeks to explain. At the same time, we are aware of the 
need for alternative de/nitions, and report results on them. These include not just 
the higher-threshold de/nitions used by PRIO, but also nonbinary alternatives based 
both on PRIO and on other data sources. See Section IVA, in which these alterna-
tives are introduced.
So far, we’ve discussed measures of con.ict incidence. Con.ict onset is a sepa-
rate notion: it describes the start of a “fresh episode” of war or violence. Our theory 
does not comfortably /t this particular concept as it is constructed to explain the 
intensity of con.ict and not the decision of triggering it. Nevertheless, in the inter-
est of robustness, we provide results in Section IVD for various de/nitions of onset 
provided by PRIO.
B. Distributional Indices
Our core independent variables are the indices G, F, and P. In line with 
Proposition 1, the index G enters the regression divided by total population, N, 
expressed in millions. In order to compute these indices we need the relevant groups 
for every country and a proxy for the “distance” in preferences across groups.
Groups.—Our analysis is based on data generously furnished by James Fearon. This 
dataset is an update of the one in Fearon (2003b), which identi/es over 800 “ethnic 
and ethnoreligious” groups in 160 countries.12 Fearon compares his groupings with 
other similar efforts; see Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), Gurr (1996), and Alesina et al. 
(2003). While recognizing that many “ethnic” classi/cations today are an inescapable 
product of history, he notes: “If there are multiple plausible ways of listing a coun-
try’s ‘ethnic groups,’ we must be careful that we do not, in effect, choose the coding 
that best supports our theory, after the fact” (Fearon 2003a, p. 198). Throughout, 
there is a conscious effort to get at a classi/cation that is deeply rooted in everyday 
recognition of existing groupings, yet not guided in any way by the existence of inter-
group antagonisms. In our opinion, this is one of the most careful attempts to describe 
ethnic divisions, with no particular focus on ethnic con.ict in the description.
We adopt the Fearon classi/cation with no changes, though with some natural res-
ervations. We test the robustness of our /ndings in Section IVB by using raw infor-
mation on the size of different linguistic groups—and linguistic distances across 
those groups—provided by Ethnologue (Lewis 2009).
Preferences and Distances.—Next comes the construction of intergroup dis-
tances. Ideally, as discussed in Section I, we would like to have distances induced 
by preferences over public goods. But there is no data on such preferences, and 
if there were, they would necessarily be plagued by endogeneity. A history of 
con.ict presumably contributes to sizable intergroup “distances” in attitudes. 
In an attempt to avoid such problems, we follow Greenberg (1956); Fearon and 
12 Attention is restricted to groups that account for over one percent of country population. The average number 
of ethnic groups per country is around /ve, with half the countries housing three to /ve groups, though the African 
average exceeds eight. About 70 percent of countries have a single ethnic group that is a majority, though in most 
cases the largest minority is pretty large: only around 20 percent of all countries have a single group that accounts 
for over 90 percent of the population.
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Laitin (1999, 2000); Laitin (2000); Fearon (2003a); Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and 
Weber (2009); and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012), and employ the 
linguistic distance between two groups13 as an appropriate indicator for their differ-
ence in preferences over public goods.
The different languages spoken can be organized in a language tree capturing 
their genealogy. All Indo-European languages, for instance, will belong to a com-
mon subtree. Subsequent splits create further “subsubtrees,” down to the current 
language map.14 Ethnologue reports a maximum of 15 steps of branching, though 
of course, not all modern language families hit this upper bound along their own 
evolutionary branches.15 The distance between two “cultures” can be approximated 
by lack of proximity on the language tree. Speci/cally, de/ne the similarity between 
two languages, i and j, sij , as the ratio of the number of common branches to the max-
imum possible number—15 for the entire tree.16 Then, following Fearon (2003a) 
and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012), we de/ne the distance between the 
two languages, κij , as κij = 1 −  s ij δ , for some parameter δ > 0.
Fearon computes distances using δ = 0.5 and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber 
(2009) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012) use δ = 0.05. We shall take 
as a baseline the value δ = 0.05, for reasons that are discussed in greater detail in 
Section IVC.
C. Additional Variables
The literature uses a variety of controls, to a large extent depending on the speci/c 
hypothesis being tested. We take as our baseline the set of controls used by MRQ, 
that is: log population (pop); log GDP per capita (gdppc); a dummy for oil/diamond 
production (oil/diam); percentage of mountainous terrain (mount); noncontiguity 
of country territory (ncontig); and democracy (democ). In all the speci/cations, the 
controls are measured in the /rst year of each period. As a robustness check, we also 
use fewer controls in some speci/cations and additional controls in others, such as 
governance variables from Polity IV and Freedom House.17 The online Appendix also 
replicates our exercise with controls used in Fearon and Laitin (2003a) and Collier, 
Hoef.er, and Rohner (2009). We also construct estimates of group concern from the 
World Values Survey, as well as indices of relative publicness of the prize, based on data 
from Polity IV and Freedom House, and of privateness of the prize, using data on oil 
13 Because of the way they are constructed, Fearon’s groups may contain subgroups speaking different lan-
guages. In this case, we follow him in taking the language spoken by the dominant subgroup as representative of 
the entire group.
14 For instance, Spanish and Basque diverge at the /rst branch, since they come from structurally unrelated lan-
guage families. By contrast, the Spanish and Catalan branches share their /rst seven nodes: Indo-European, Italic, 
Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, and Ibero-Romance languages.
15 The interested reader can /nd a detailed discussion of the language tree in Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and 
Wacziarg (2012).
16 If two groups speak the same language, sij is set to 1.
17 More speci/cally, we consider the lack of executive constraints (excons) and the level of autocracy (autocr), 
both from Polity IV, and the extent of suppression of civil liberties (civlib) and political rights (polrights) from 
Freedom House. Following Besley and Persson (2010), we use time-invariant versions of these variables, since 
short-run changes are likely to be correlated with the incidence of con.ict. See Section V and the Appendix for more 
details on the construction of these variables.
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reserves from Haber and Menaldo (2011). These variables will serve as essential ingre-
dients for the analysis of Section V that exploits the structure of the model more deeply.
A more detailed de/nition of the control variables is included in the Appendix.
III. Baseline Findings
A. Speci"cation
The goal of our exercise is to take equation (2) to the data as follows: 
(3)  σ it =  X 1it  β 1 +  X 2it  β 2 +  ε it ;  i = 1, … , C, t = 1, … , T,
where  X 1it are the relevant distributional variables in the model,  X 2it is a collection 
of controls,  ε it is an innovation, and C and T are the number of countries and time 
periods, respectively. But we don’t observe the dependent variable as written. 
Instead we will consider intensity of con.ict as a latent variable that we infer from 
the realizations of the PRIO binary variables, presuming that 
(4) P(prioit = 1 | Xit) = P(σit >  W * | Xit) = H(Xit β −  W * ),
where  X it = ( X 1it ,  X 2it ),  W * is a threshold that becomes an intercept in H, β is the vector 
of coef/cients of interest, and H is the cumulative distribution function of  ε it with 
symmetric probability density function (pdf).18 To begin with, the variables  X 1it are 
the different distributional indices P, F, and G/N. This is our baseline speci/cation, 
which effectively presumes that cohesion and the importance of public goods are the 
same across countries. Later, in Section V, we relax this restriction.
B. Baseline
Our primary dependent variable uses various measures of con.ict incidence. To 
be sure, incidence is deeply affected by past con.ict, so we use lagged con.ict as 
an additional control in all our incidence speci/cations. Table 1 reports our baseline 
results with Fearon groups and linguistic distances using δ = 0.05. In all cases, we 
compute p-values (in parentheses) using robust standard errors adjusted for clustering 
at the country level. Each column of the table contains our basic speci/cation with 
the distributional indices P, F, and G/N. The columns differ in that we progressively 
add controls. See the Appendix for descriptions of these variables. Column 1 uses no 
controls except for population, and column 2 adds in lagged con.ict. Column 3 adds 
per capita GDP. Column 4 factors in resources: a dummy variable for whether the 
country is a producer of oil or diamonds.19 Column 5 brings in geographical controls: 
mountainous terrain and whether a country has regions separated by land or water 
(“noncontiguity”). Column 6 adds the standard political control for democracy. At this 
18 When using a nonbinary indicator, we shall have two thresholds associated with two intensity levels.
19 A country “has oil” if it produces at least $100 per person (in constant 2000 dollars) in rents from oil. A coun-
try “has diamonds” if diamonds are produced locally. We take this information from Ross (2011).
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stage, the set of controls we use is in line with MRQ, and we use this as our baseline 
control set. Column 7 adds in more political and governance controls.
Throughout, P, F, and G/N are signi/cant. P has the expected positive coef/cient 
and is highly signi/cant. The coef/cient associated with F is also positive; G/N, 
while also signi/cant, has negative sign; we interpret this below. Moreover, lagged 
con.ict is highly signi/cant and, in line with a common result in all the literature 
on con.ict with cross-country data, per capita income is signi/cantly and negatively 
correlated with con.ict.20 Finally, we do not see a direct effect of natural resources, 
20 We have also examined the effect of income inequality. Using the Gini of personal incomes as a regressor has 
no effect either on the value of the coef/cient corresponding to P or on its signi/cance.
Table 1—Baseline Specification with prio25, Fearon Groupings 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
P 7.73***(0.005) 6.07***(0.002) 6.90***(0.000) 6.96***(0.001) 7.38***(0.001) 7.39***(0.001) 6.50***(0.004)
F 2.59***(0.000) 1.86***(0.000) 1.13**(0.029) 1.09**(0.042) 1.30**(0.012) 1.30**(0.012) 1.25**(0.020)
G/N −6.95*(0.067) −5.47**(0.011) −4.37*(0.077) −4.45*(0.071) −4.77*(0.072) −4.80*(0.068) −5.09*(0.074)
pop 0.30***(0.009) 0.19**(0.014) 0.23**(0.012) 0.22**(0.012) 0.13(0.141) 0.13(0.141) 0.14(0.131)
gdppc — — −0.40***(0.001) −0.41***(0.002) −0.47***(0.001) −0.47***(0.001) −0.38**(0.011)
oil/diam — — — 0.06(0.777) 0.04(0.858) 0.04(0.870) −0.10(0.643)
mount — — — — 0.01(0.134) 0.01(0.136) 0.01(0.145)
ncont — — — — 0.84**(0.019) 0.85**(0.018) 0.90**(0.011)
democ — — — — — −0.02(0.944)
0.02(0.944)
excons — — — — — — −0.13(0.741)
autocr — — — — — — 0.14(0.609)
polrights — — — — — — 0.17(0.614)
civlib — — — — — — 0.16(0.666)
lag — 2.91***(0.000) 2.81***(0.000) 2.80***(0.000) 2.73***(0.000) 2.73***(0.000) 2.79***(0.000)
const −7.28***(0.000) −6.20***(0.000) −3.33**(0.023) −3.20**(0.028) −1.47(0.326) −1.49(0.322) −2.42(0.147)
Pseudo-R2 0.13 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40
Observations 1,289 1,149 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,013
C 141 141 138 138 138 138 137
Notes: p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have been employed to 
compute z-statistics.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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though when this is used to construct a measure of relative publicness and interacted 
with distributional measures in the way suggested by the theory, it will have a highly 
signi/cant impact (see Table 9).
Using the theory summarized in Proposition 1 and the assumption that α and λ are 
constant across countries, it is possible to provide an interpretation for the estimated 
parameters. First, the fact that P is highly signi/cant suggests that both the publicness 
of the prize (λ) as well as the degree of group cohesion (α) are signi/cant. Moreover, 
our results for G/N suggest that α is close to or perhaps even larger than 1, indicating 
that models of free-riding are perhaps less relevant than we make them out to be, at 
least in the cases of civil con.ict in the data.21 One obvious possibility is selection: 
observed con.icts must have been successful in resolving the collective action prob-
lem, so that such con.icts must be associated with a high value of group cohesion.
As for the public component, whether it is economic (control of a labor or housing 
market, or a trade), cultural (the establishment of some notion of ideological or reli-
gious superiority), or political (control of the state) is something we cannot identify. 
All we can say is that it is central to con.ict. At the same time, the signi/cance of 
F suggests that private components, such as the existence of natural resources, are 
also important. While natural resources in and of themselves are not signi/cant in 
our regressions, we shall see in Section V that they come fully into their own when 
interacted with the distributional variables as directed by the theory.
Our interpretation—that both public and private goods matter for con.ict—
is relevant to the discussion on greed versus grievance as motivations for ethnic 
con.ict introduced by Collier and Hoef.er.22 While we are not sure of the utility 
of this distinction, one possible interpretation is that “greed” corresponds to con-
.ict over private goods, while “grievance” would come under the rubric of public 
goods (political rights and freedoms, or religious dominance). Our exercise points 
to the importance of both motives, and this will be enhanced further as we exploit 
the model structure even more in Section V.
Finally, we point to the quantitative importance of polarization and fractional-
ization in con.ict. Consider the baseline set of controls (Table 1, column 6). Our 
estimated coef/cients imply that if we move from the 20th percentile of polariza-
tion to the 80th percentile, holding all other variables at their means, the prob-
ability of con.ict rises from approximately 13 percent to 29 percent. Performing 
the same exercise for F takes us from 12 percent to 25 percent. These are similar 
(and strong) effects.
C. Country Examples and Scatters
Here are some country-speci/c examples to accompany the main /ndings of 
Table 1. This is an interesting task, as both polarization and fractionalization are 
positively related to con.ict, but they are related to each other in a nonmonotonic 
way. Our strategy, then, is to work off the marginals (polarization controlling for 
fractionalization, and vice versa).
21 The observation that α > 1 means that individuals might effectively be placing more weight on the group than 
they do on themselves.
22 See Collier and Hoef.er (2004) and, more recently, Collier, Hoef.er, and Rohner (2009).
1321ESTEBAN ET AL.: ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDYVOL. 102 NO. 4
Chile exhibits the median fractionalization in our country set. If we focus on 
countries in the 45–55th percentiles of F and rank these countries in increasing order 
of polarization, we obtain the list in Table 2, panel A. Similarly, Taiwan exhibits the 
median polarization in the sample. Once again, if we restrict attention to countries 
in the 45–55th percentiles of P and rank them in increasing order of fractionaliza-
tion, we obtain the list in Table 2, panel B. In each case, the /rst numerical column 
lists the intensity of con.ict (at the worst point during 1960–2008): 0 when deaths 
fall below the prio25 threshold, 1 when that threshold is crossed but not the higher 
prio1000 mark, and 2 when the latter threshold is exceeded. The second numeri-
cal column records the number of years of con.ict incidence in the period 1960–
2008: it could well exceed the total number of years in the sample (as in the case of 
Myanmar) if there are multiple con.icts.
Even with no other controls in this table, it is fair to say that the results are sup-
portive of the econometric /ndings in Table 1 and in the tables to follow. Controlling 
for fractionalization, higher polarization goes with higher con.ict, and the same is 
true of fractionalization once we control for polarization.
To be sure, it is too much to assert that every con.ict in our dataset is ethnic in 
nature, and that our ethnic variables capture them fully.23 Consider China, or Haiti, or 
undivided Korea, which have experienced con.ict and yet have low polarization and 
fractionalization. All con.ict is not ethnic. What is remarkable is that many of them are.
We end this section by illustrating our baseline regression with scatter plots that 
capture the marginal effects of polarization and fractionalization on con.ict. Figure 1 
does this. Panel A shows how polarization is related to con.ict, conditioning by 
23 To explore whether our results are driven by a particular group of observations, we have employed several 
tools to detect the in.uential observations in the sample. There are 78, 43, and 117 in.uential observations accord-
ing to the Pearson residual, deviance residual, and Pregibon leverage statistics, respectively. The online Appendix 
reproduces column 6 in Table 1 once in.uential observations have been removed from the sample. The signi/cance 
of P and F remains unaffected.
Table 2—Distribution and Conflict with Country Examples
Panel A Intensity Years Panel B Intensity Years
Dom. Rep. 1  1 Germany  0  0
Morocco 1  15 Armenia  0  0
US 0  0 Austria  0  0
Serbia-Mont. 2 2 Taiwan  0  0
Spain 1 5 Algeria  2  22
Macedonia 1 1 Zimbabwe  2  9 
Chile  1  1 Belgium  0  0
Panama  1  1 US  0  0
Nepal  2  14 Morocco  1  15
Canada  0  0 Serbia-Mont.  2  2
Myanmar  2  117 Latvia  0  0
Kyrgystan 0 0 Trin. Tob.  1  1
Sri Lanka  2 26 Guinea-Bissau  1  13
Estonia  0  0 Sierra Leone  2  10
Guatemala  1  30 Mozambique  2  27
Notes: Panel A ranks the median fractionalization decile in increasing order of polarization. 
Panel B ranks the median polarization decile in increasing order of fractionalization.
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other covariates. Panel B relates fractionalization to con.ict in exactly the same 
way. The two scatters illustrate our baseline /ndings well.24
IV. Extensions and Variations
We analyze some variations to examine the robustness of the baseline in Table 1. 
We study (i) alternative measures of con.ict; (ii) an alternative criterion for groups; 
(iii) the choice of intergroup distances; (iv) onset versus incidence; (v) controls for 
region and time; and (vi) alternative estimation strategies.
A. Alternative Measures of Con!ict
Our baseline uses the con.ict binary variable prio25. PRIO reports other indi-
cators, and nonbinary alternatives are also possible. Table 3 reports on the use 
of alternative dependent variables to proxy con.ict. Column 1 repeats column 6 
from the baseline speci/cation for comparison (the same controls are used here). 
Column 2 employs the intermediate notion priocw, which is prio25 augmented by 
the requirement that the overall con.ict must yield at least 1,000 deaths. Column 3 
uses prio1000, the PRIO de/nition of civil war, which demands at least 1,000 deaths 
per year. Column 4 reports on a nonbinary measure of intensity—prioint—based 
on the PRIO dataset, that separates con.ict episodes satisfying prio1000 from the 
rest. “Peace” is assigned a value of 0, events satisfying prio25 that are not prio1000 
are assigned 1, and events recorded as prio1000 are assigned 2.25 Finally, col-
umn 5 uses an alternative measure of con.ict intensity: the continuous index of 
social con.ict (isc) as computed by the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive 
24 Con.ict is the average of prio25 over the sample. Time-varying covariates are referred to 1960. The graphs 
plot the residuals from the linear regressions: panel A, (1) P on all other covariates, (2) con.ict on all other covari-
ates (excluding P); panel B, (1) F on all other covariates, (2) con.ict on all other covariates (excluding F).
25 We do not use priocw in the de/nition because it relies on the overall number of deaths, and does not neces-
sarily imply a higher intensity in any particular year.
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Figure 1. Polarization, Fractionalization, and Conflict
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(CNTS).26 It provides a measure of the level of social unrest with no threshold 
dividing “peace” from “war.” The index isc is formed by taking a weighted aver-
age over eight different manifestations of internal con.ict, adopted from Rummel 
(1963). For details of variables and weights, see the Appendix.27 As always in cases 
of incidence, we use lagged values of the con.ict variable as a control, in addition to 
the other controls in column 6 of Table 1.
Throughout, P has the expected positive coef/cient and is highly signi/cant; F 
is also positive and signi/cant in most of the speci/cations; G/N continues to have 
negative sign, but is not signi/cant in most cases. Of course, lagged con.ict contin-
ues to be highly signi/cant, as is per capita income. To obtain some idea of strengths: 
a move from the 20th percentile to the 80th percentile in polarization (keeping all 
other variables at their means) raises the probability of priocw from approximately 
7 percent to 17 percent, while it increases the likelihood of prio1000 from under 
3 percent to a bit under 10 percent. A corresponding change in fractionalization has 
26 See Banks (2008).
27 The correlation between isc and prio25 and prioint is 0.52 and 0.57, respectively.
Table 3—Different Conflict Variables, Fearon Groupings
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
P 7.39***(0.001) 6.76***(0.007) 10.47***(0.001) 6.50***(0.000) 25.90***(0.003)
F 1.30**(0.012) 1.39**(0.034) 1.11*(0.086) 1.30***(0.006) 2.27(0.187)
G/N −4.80*(0.068) −5.70(0.271) −12.47*(0.062) −4.82*(0.071) −2.09(0.399)
gdppc −0.47***(0.001) −0.35*(0.066) −0.63***(0.000) −0.40***(0.002) −1.70***(0.001)
pop 0.13(0.141) 0.19*(0.056) 0.13(0.215) 0.10(0.166) 1.11***(0.000)
oil/diam 0.04(0.870) 0.06(0.825) −0.03(0.927) −0.04(0.816) −0.57(0.463)
mount 0.01(0.136) 0.01**(0.034) 0.01(0.323) 0.00(0.282) 0.04**(0.022)
ncont 0.85**(0.018) 0.62(0.128) 0.78*(0.052) 0.55*(0.069) 4.38***(0.004)
democ −0.02(0.944) −0.09(0.790) −0.41(0.230) −0.03(0.909) 0.06(0.944)
lag 2.73***(0.000) 3.74***(0.000) 2.78***(0.000) 2.00***(0.000) 0.50***(0.000)
const −1.49(0.322) −4.28**(0.017) −1.10(0.609)
— −2.75(0.521)
Pseudo-R2 0.39 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.41
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,111
C 138 138 138 138 138
DepVar prio25 priocw prio1000 prioint isc
Notes: Columns 1–3, logit; column 4, ordered logit; column 5, ordinary least squares (OLS). p-values are reported 
in parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have been employed to compute z-statistics.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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similar effects: priocw goes from under 7 percent to 16 percent, while prio1000 
increases from approximately 3 percent to 6 percent.
While our results are generally robust to the choice of other dependent variables, 
we record our own preferences. The variable prio25 is generally useful, because 
it serves as a repository of all con.icts. In contrast, prio1000 will fail to register 
con.icts that run into hundreds of deaths per year. To be sure, the choice will depend 
on the questions being asked, but there is no way in which our theory allows us to 
eliminate (as examples) the Palestinian or Guatemalan con.icts, neither of which 
receive a coding in any year of the PRIO dataset (up to 2008) as a prio1000 con.ict. 
Moreover, the cumulative deaths in all these cases are sizable.28 This motivates our 
strong preference for PRIO’s own baseline de/nition of con.ict using prio25, and 
in what follows, we will not emphasize prio1000 any longer.
Another option, and one that we have a distinct preference for, is the use of 
prioint, which places larger weight on prio1000 con.icts as described above. We 
use prio25 only because it is standard, but prioint performs just as well in every 
one of the regressions displayed for prio25. The online Appendix contains a full set 
of estimations using prioint.
B. Alternative Groupings
We have already discussed the classi/cation of ethnic groups in Fearon (2003a). 
It is one that we use with some con/dence, because of the deep recognition of endo-
geneity in his discussion and the careful attempts made to avoid such issues. Yet, 
at some level, the ethnic groupings do re.ect contemporary relevance. The cases of 
Rwanda, Burundi, or Somalia, in which there is full homogeneity in language, or 
of Papua, where no linguistic group reaches one percent of the population, clearly 
suggest that the de/nition of the “relevant” ethnic groups often involves careful but 
active intervention by the researcher.
In the interests of robustness, then, we use entirely ungrouped raw information 
on the size of different linguistic groups—and linguistic groups alone—provided by 
Ethnologue.29 The Ethnologue project lists 6,912 known living languages and gives 
the population sizes that use each language in each country.30 Speaking a different 
language certainly sets a barrier with one’s neighbor and can be considered a sound 
though distant base for differences in preferences for public goods. While it is ludi-
crous to suggest that modern-day con.icts take place across the groups recorded in 
Ethnologue, it is reasonable to expect that such language distinctions could form the 
basis of cultural and social differences. The econometric advantage of that connec-
tion is obvious: it permits a more adequate defense of exogeneity, possibly at the 
expense of direct causality. This is a standard trade-off.31
28 There are many other examples. To choose a current one, the Indian government has described the ongoing Maoist 
con.ict in tribal areas as the greatest internal security threat to the country. Yet, while the con.ict has been severe, with 
many killings, the annual numbers have been in the hundreds, but below the prio1000 threshold, as of 2010.
29 The information from Ethnologue has already been used for the analysis of con.ict by Alesina et al. (2009); 
Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2009); and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012).
30 For instance, in the case of Mexico, Ethnologue reports 291 living languages. In contrast, the number of ethnic 
groups for this country in Fearon’s dataset is four (Mestizo, Amerindian, White, and Mayan).
31 An alternative approach, which we have examined with equal success for P, is to instrument for the distribu-
tional measures obtained from Fearon groupings using their counterparts from the Ethnologue classi/cation. The 
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Table 4 exactly replicates Table 3 using the group sizes furnished by Ethnologue. 
The behavior of the polarization index P, as well as that of G/N, is unchanged. In 
particular, polarization continues to be as signi/cant as in our previous exercise (even 
the estimated coef/cients are very close). But fractionalization is no longer signi/cant. 
This is not surprising. Indices that fail to take intergroup distances into account are less 
robust to the de/nition of groupings. We return to this issue in Section IVC.
C. Group Distances
A separate concern is the robustness of our results with respect to the param-
eter δ for the distance variable. We use δ = 0.05, as do Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and 
Wacziarg (2012). Fearon (2003a) uses δ = 0.5. None of these choices is satisfactorily 
/rst-stage correlations are high: for instance, the correlation between the two polarization indices (when δ = 0.05 
in both cases) is equal to 0.70. But we /nd it dif/cult to push the exclusion restriction that all linguistic sources 
of con.ict must of necessity transmit themselves via the Fearon grouping, which, too, is a step removed from the 
groups directly engaged in con.ict. We therefore restrict ourselves to simply reporting the reduced-form estimates 
using Ethnologue, as a robustness exercise.
Table 4—Different Conflict Variables, ETHNOLOGUE Groupings
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
P 8.26***(0.001) 8.17***(0.005) 10.10**(0.016) 7.28***(0.001) 27.04***(0.008)
F 0.64(0.130) 0.75(0.167) 0.51(0.341) 0.52(0.185) −0.58(0.685)
G/N −2.13(0.121) −1.59(0.389) −8.35(0.205) −2.15*(0.099) −0.26(0.907)
gdppc −0.51***(0.000) −0.39**(0.022) −0.63***(0.000) −0.45***(0.000) −2.03***(0.000)
pop 0.15*(0.100) 0.24**(0.020) 0.15(0.198) 0.12(0.118) 1.20***(0.000)
oil/diam 0.15(0.472) 0.21(0.484) 0.10(0.758) 0.08(0.660) −0.06(0.943)
mount 0.01*(0.058) 0.01**(0.015) 0.01(0.247) 0.01*(0.099) 0.04**(0.013)
ncont 0.72**(0.034) 0.49(0.210) 0.50(0.194) 0.44(0.136) 4.12***(0.006)
democ 0.03(0.906) 0.00(0.993) −0.32(0.350)
0.03(0.898) 0.02(0.979)
lag 2.73***(0.000) 3.75***(0.000) 2.83***(0.000) 2.01***(0.000) 0.50***(0.000)
const −1.42(0.379) −4.62**(0.018) −1.26(0.556)
— −0.69(0.881)
Pseudo-R2 0.37 0.49 0.37 0.32 0.40
Observations 1,117 1,117 1,117 1,117 1,103
C 137 137 137 137 137
DepVar prio25 priocw prio1000 prioint isc
Notes: Columns 1–3, logit; column 4, ordered logit; column 5, OLS; p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering have been employed to compute z-statistics.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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motivated. Yet the choice is important because it implicitly selects the levels of lin-
guistic (dis)similarity to be emphasized. Low values of δ will essentially separate 
the languages that have very few branches in common from the rest. As we pro-
gressively increase δ, small differences acquire greater salience while the bigger 
differences play a less than proportional role. In the limit as δ → ∞, the smallest 
difference is identi/ed as a complete difference, indistinguishable from deeper lin-
guistic cleavages. The polarization measure that corresponds to this limit would 
only use binary 0–1 “distances,” and is at the heart of MRQ’s empirical study: 
 R =  ∑ 
i=1
m
   ∑ 
j≠i
m
   n i n j =  ∑ 
i=1
m
   n i 2 (1 −  n i ).
In a sense, it is possible to treat δ as a parameter and estimate it.32 Following 
Hansen (1996), consider a grid of values of δ ∈ (0, ∞), which generates associated 
values for P and G, and estimate the baseline speci/cation for each of these values. 
The estimate of δ is the one for which the maximum value of the pseudo-likelihood 
is reached. We do not follow this estimation procedure, but it is worth inspecting the 
pseudo-likelihoods for different values of δ.33
Figure 2 reports these values for both the Fearon and Ethnologue groupings. 
Fearon comes pregrouped, as it were: the small distances have already been removed 
in the choice of groupings themselves, so that the likelihood initially rises and is 
then relatively .at about its maximum value over a rather wide range, beginning 
with small values of δ; see panel A. Our choice of δ = 0.05 is a perfectly reasonable 
choice under this criterion, but had we chosen another value in the range of the .at 
segment, we would have done just as well in terms of /t. The Ethnologue grouping 
is different, however. Because every language forms a separate group, our /t is quite 
sensitive to the choice of δ, and decays rapidly as we insist on emphasizing every 
32 Alternatively, one could reestimate the model with other values of δ to check robustness. See the online 
Appendix for some exercises along these lines.
33 Formally, δ is only identi/ed when the coef/cients of P or G/N are different from zero. Selecting δ in a data-
dependent fashion would require one to use nonstandard asymptotic distributions and testing procedures to test for 
the signi/cance of the regression coef/cients, since the distributions of the conventional t or F tests would depend 
on unknown nuisance parameters. (See Hansen 1996.)
Figure 2. Pseudo-Likelihoods for Different Values of δ 
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language difference as important; i.e., as we raise the value of δ; see panel B and 
note that the axes in panels A and B have very different scales.
We illustrate this argument in the special case of the “binary” polarization mea-
sure R which, as we’ve noted, effectively sets δ = ∞. The correlation between 
P (with δ = 0.05) and R is 0.45; see the online Appendix for the scatter plot. In 
Table 5, column 1 reproduces the baseline estimates for prio25 from column 6 of 
Table 1, using the Fearon groupings. Column 2 replaces P with the binary index R. 
The parallels between the two are evident: R simply takes over from P. This column 
can be viewed as a replication of the basic equation in MRQ. Column 3 of the table 
puts together both P and R along with the other distributional equations into a single 
equation. The comparison continues to yield symmetric outcomes: now P and R are 
both signi/cant, and on very similar terms. Thus, while P is a powerful explanatory 
variable, so, it seems, is R.
There is a striking difference, however, once we employ classi/cations based 
on completely ungrouped linguistic criteria. Now it is imperative to carry a 
Table 5—P (with δ = 0.05) versus R, Fearon and ETHNOLOGUE Groupings
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P 7.39***(0.001) — 5.87***(0.009) 8.26***(0.001) — 9.02***(0.000)
F 1.30**(0.012) 0.45(0.493) 0.56(0.388) 0.64(0.130) 0.63(0.192) 0.79(0.108)
R — 7.13***(0.004) 5.12**(0.046) — 1.09(0.560) −1.52(0.418)
G/N −4.80*(0.068) − 0.90(0.562) −4.38*(0.080) −2.13(0.121)
0.05(0.953) −2.29*(0.100)
gdppc −0.47***(0.001) −0.56***(0.000) −0.57***(0.000) −0.51***(0.000) −0.45***(0.001) −0.48***(0.000)
pop 0.13(0.141) 0.23***(0.005) 0.15*(0.078) 0.15*(0.100) 0.20***(0.030) 0.15(0.105)
oil/diam 0.04(0.870) 0.07(0.739) 0.08(0.712) 0.15(0.472) 0.11(0.598) 0.13(0.544)
mount 0.01(0.136) 0.01(0.162) 0.00(0.344) 0.01*(0.058) 0.01**(0.025) 0.01**(0.048)
ncont 0.85**(0.018) 0.82**(0.015) 0.93***(0.010) 0.72**(0.034) 0.51(0.116) 0.72**(0.033)
democ −0.02(0.944)
0.04(0.883) −0.01(0.977)
0.03(0.906) 0.10(0.703) 0.01(0.977)
lag 2.73***(0.000) 2.74***(0.000) 2.70***(0.000) 2.73***(0.000) 2.80***(0.000) 2.73***(0.000)
const −1.49(0.322) −2.75*(0.053) −1.31(0.393) −1.42(0.379) −2.54(0.107) −1.50(0.345)
Pseudo-R2 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.37
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,117 1,117 1,117
C 138 138 138 137 137 137
Groups Fearon Fearon Fearon Eth Eth Eth
Notes: Dependent variable is prio25. p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clus-
tering have been employed to compute z-statistics.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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notion of distance, otherwise every pair of groups will appear equally distinct. 
To see this, consider our speci/cation using Ethnologue; we’ve reproduced col-
umn 1 from Table 4 as column 4 here. Once again, P is highly signi/cant. But 
this time the replacement of P by R in column 5 is not met with equal success, or 
indeed with any success at all; R is entirely insigni/cant. Finally, the horse race 
between P and R in column 6 is resolved unambiguously in favor of P: R plays 
no role at all.
The reason why R might be problematic is simple. Ethnologue groupings are fully 
linguistic in nature. It is reasonable to presume that con.ict in society did not follow 
every such linguistic division. Allowing this outcome to be tempered by a consid-
eration of intergroup distances (even the linguistic “distances” that we adopt in the 
interest of exogeneity) helps enormously. Binary measures of polarization are too 
coarse to achieve this modulation in any meaningful way. The data fully support 
such an assertion.
D. Onset versus Incidence
Our baseline speci/cation uses incidence rather than onset, because the theory is 
silent on the initial decision to go to con.ict.34 Moreover, the operational distinction 
between onset and incidence depends on taking the PRIO thresholds quite literally. 
Before the threshold is crossed, we might have several manifestations of serious con-
.ict (a breakdown in negotiations, an insurgency, a crackdown). “Onset” as de/ned by 
the PRIO threshold is far from a sharp concept: it is arguably no different from a year 
of “incidence,” though to be sure, the factors that contribute to the outbreak of a con-
.ict do not coincide with the ones that keep feeding it (Schneider and Wiesehomeier 
2006). This is why we control for lagged con.ict in our incidence regressions.
That said, in the interest of robustness, Table 6 provides some onset regres-
sions. The binary onset variable onset n switches on in a particular year if the 
incidence requirement is met (at the level of prio25), but not in n or more previ-
ous years.35 We take three de/nitions of onset by setting n = 2, 5, 8.36 The /rst 
three columns report onset for Fearon groupings. The next three do the same for 
Ethnologue groupings.37
It is clear that nothing of importance changes in the results. In each of the speci-
/cations, polarization is positive and (usually) highly signi/cant. Fractionalization 
and the Greenberg-Gini continue to be generally signi/cant, though not as strongly.
E. Region and Time Effects
We check whether the results are driven by particular regions that might be con-
sidered more (or less) con.ictual. Table 7 reports on the /ndings. Column 1 is 
just the baseline speci/cation for easy comparison. Column 2 introduces regional 
34 See Esteban and Ray (2008b) for a two-stage model of con.ict onset.
35 See Strand (2006) for the PRIO-based dataset on con.ict onset.
36 Note that if one adopts a stricter notion of con.ict, such as prio1000, peace becomes a looser concept.
37 To maintain symmetry, we carry lagged dependent variables in these regressions as well. Not much is achieved 
thereby, in contrast to the case of con.ict incidence. The variables are insigni/cant, and their inclusion or exclusion 
makes no difference.
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dummies. Columns 3–5 eliminate a region each: Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 
in that order. Column 6 returns to the baseline but this time with a full set of overall 
time dummies, one for each period in the sample except for the /rst one. Column 7 
controls for possibly different regional time trends. To this effect, we introduce 
regional dummies interacted with a time trend.
It appears that the signi/cance of polarization, overwhelmingly at around the one 
percent level, is unshakeable. Fractionalization is positive and signi/cant as well, 
often highly so. The Greenberg-Gini coef/cient is signi/cant and it continues to 
have the ubiquitous negative sign.
F. Alternative Estimation Strategies
Table 8 summarizes other ways of estimating the con.ict equation. To facilitate 
comparison, column 1 recalls the baseline speci/cation in column 6 of Table 1. 
Column 2 presents estimates obtained in a pure cross-sectional regression. In this 
case, the dependent variable is the average over the 1960–2008 period of prio25, 
Table 6—Conflict Onset, Fearon and ETHNOLOGUE GroupingS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P 7.85***(0.000) 7.41***(0.000) 7.26***(0.000) 8.83***(0.000) 8.84***(0.000) 8.71***(0.000)
F 0.94*(0.050) 0.72(0.139) 0.62(0.204) 0.39(0.336) 0.20(0.602) 0.15(0.702)
G/N −10.19***(0.002) −8.44***(0.004) −8.23***(0.007) −3.70**(0.033) −3.92**(0.026) −3.78**(0.035)
gdppc −0.60***(0.000) −0.65***(0.000) −0.68***(0.000) −0.64***(0.000) −0.70***(0.000) −0.73***(0.000)
pop 0.01(0.863) 0.03(0.711) 0.03(0.748) 0.06(0.493) 0.05(0.588) 0.05(0.619)
oil/diam 0.54**(0.016) 0.46**(0.022) 0.47**(0.025) 0.64***(0.004) 0.56***(0.005) 0.57***(0.007)
mount 0.00(0.527) 0.00(0.619) 0.00(0.620) 0.00(0.295) 0.00(0.410) 0.00(0.424)
ncont 0.74***(0.005) 0.66**(0.010) 0.42(0.104) 0.66**(0.012) 0.63**(0.017) 0.40(0.120)
democ −0.06(0.816) 0.06(0.808) 0.08(0.766) −0.02(0.936) 0.09(0.716) 0.10(0.704)
lag 0.32(0.164) −0.08(0.740) −0.08(0.751) 0.29(0.214) −0.13(0.618) −0.13(0.622)
const 1.67(0.310) 1.74(0.269) 2.04(0.199) 1.27(0.448) 1.93(0.227) 2.19(0.173)
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09
Groups Fearon Fearon Fearon Eth Eth Eth
Observations 988 988 988 980 980 980
C 138 138 138 137 137 137
DepVar. onset2 onset5 onset8 onset2 onset5 onset8
Notes: p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have been employed to 
compute z-statistics.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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while data on all time-dependent variables come from 1960. Column 3 estimates 
our baseline speci/cation using annual data in Fearon (2005).38 Column 4 uses 
rare events estimation to correct for the bias created in a logit model for the small 
number of con.ict observations relative to the total, as in King and Zeng (2001). 
Column 5 presents the same results as column 1 using the linear probability model. 
Finally, column 6 uses a linear speci/cation and allows for the possibility that the 
distributional coef/cients for each country are random draws from a probability 
distribution, while the other coef/cients are held /xed as before. We return to this 
particular speci/cation in the next section.
It is fair to say that in the variations we study (and in others not reported here), our 
conclusions are unaltered. The coef/cients of F and P are generally positive and highly 
signi/cant. The variable G/N is negative and sometimes signi/cant. Our overall inter-
pretation of these results, as discussed in the baseline speci/cation, remains unchanged.
38 Fearon’s sample runs from 1960 to 1999. Since annual data on democracy are not available in this sample, the 
value of democ corresponding to the /rst /ve-year period, 1960–1965, has been used instead.
Table 7—Region and Time Effects, Fearon Groupings
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
P 7.39***(0.001)  6.64***(0.002)  5.36**(0.034)  7.24***(0.001)  9.56***(0.001) 7.39***(0.001) 7.19***(0.001)
F 1.30**(0.012)  2.03***(0.001)  2.74***(0.001)  1.28**(0.030)  1.49***(0.009) 1.33**(0.012) 1.76***(0.001)
G/N −4.80*(0.068) −5.59**(0.039) −7.31*(0.070) −5.06*(0.065) −4.81*(0.078) −5.01*(0.060) −6.09**(0.032)
gdppc −0.47***(0.001) −0.72***(0.000) −0.69***(0.000) −0.39**(0.024) −0.45***(0.006) −0.49***(0.001) −0.60***(0.000)
pop 0.13(0.141) 0.05(0.635) 0.09(0.388) 0.06(0.596)  0.17*(0.087) 0.14(0.125) 0.06(0.543)
oil/diam 0.04(0.870) 0.12(0.562) 0.14(0.630) 0.10(0.656) 0.10(0.687) 0.05(0.824) 0.15(0.476)
mount 0.01(0.136) 0.00(0.331) 0.00(0.512) 0.01(0.114)  0.01**(0.038) 0.01(0.109) 0.01(0.212)
ncont 0.85**(0.018)  0.87**(0.018)  0.75*(0.064)  0.83**(0.039) 0.62(0.134)  0.82**(0.025)  0.77**(0.040)
democ −0.02(0.944) 0.08(0.761) −0.03(0.932) −0.23(0.389) 0.10(0.716) 0.08(0.750) 0.13(0.621)
lag 2.73***(0.000)  2.68***(0.000)  2.83***(0.000)  2.69***(0.000)  2.92***(0.000)  2.79***(0.000)  2.74***(0.000)
const −1.49(0.322) 1.91(0.324) 0.86(0.708) −0.95(0.557) −2.68(0.115) −2.03(0.199) 0.69(0.681)
Pseudo-R2 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.35 0.43 0.39 0.39
Reg/Time None Reg. Dum. No Africa No Asia No Lat. Am. Trend Interac.
Observations 1,125 1,125 779 963 936 1,125 1,125
C 138 138 98 117 117 138 138
Notes: prio25 throughout; p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have 
been employed to compute z-statistics.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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V. Intercountry Variations in Publicness, Privateness, and Cohesion
An important insight of equation (2) is that the effect of each distributional measure 
is in.uenced in speci/c ways by the relative publicness of con.ict payoffs, as well as 
the extent of group cohesion. Recall equation (2), and note that λ ≡ pi/(pi + $) mea-
sures the “relative publicness” of the prize. Observe that the impact of P is enhanced by 
λ, and that of F by (1 − λ). In particular, when all con.icts are public, fractionalization 
cannot matter, while if all con.icts are private, polarization cannot matter. But the pres-
ence of group cohesion strengthens both these variables; consult equation (2).
While we’ve discussed this interpretation using the baseline speci/cation, it isn’t 
hard to imagine that relative publicness is country-speci/c, and so is the extent of 
group cohesion. That places stress on the cross-country speci/cation so far, which 
presumes—the presence of additive controls notwithstanding—that the coef/cients 
on the distributional variables are independent of country. The random-coef/cients 
speci/cation in the very last column of Table 8 is of particular interest here. Using 
Table 8—Alternative Estimation Strategies, Fearon Groupings
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P 7.39***(0.001) 11.84***(0.003) 4.68**(0.015) 7.13***(0.000) 0.86***(0.004) 0.95***(0.001)
F 1.30**(0.012) 2.92***(0.001) 1.32***(0.003) 1.27***(0.005) 0.13**(0.025) 0.16***(0.008)
G/N −4.80*(0.068) −5.53(0.136) −3.54(0.133) −4.12(0.192) −0.16*(0.061) −0.17(0.286)
gdppc −0.47***(0.001) −0.77***(0.001) −0.29**(0.036) −0.46***(0.000) −0.05***(0.000) −0.06***(0.000)
pop 0.13(0.141) 0.03(0.858) 0.14(0.123) 0.14**(0.090) 0.02**(0.020) 0.02**(0.032)
oil/diam 0.04(0.870)  0.94**(0.028) 0.29(0.280) 0.04(0.850) 0.00(0.847) 0.01(0.682)
mount 0.01(0.136) 0.01(0.102) 0.00(0.510) 0.01(0.185) 0.00(0.101) 0.00(0.179)
ncont 0.85**(0.018) 1.51***(0.007)  0.62*(0.052) 0.83***(0.002) 0.09**(0.019) 0.10***(0.006)
democ −0.02(0.944) −0.48(0.212) −0.09(0.690) −0.02(0.941) 0.01(0.788) 0.01(0.585)
lag 2.73***(0.000)
— 4.69***(0.000) 2.69***(0.000) 0.54***(0.000) 0.45***(0.000)
const −1.49(0.322)
— −2.23**(0.027) −1.62(0.322) 0.10(0.514) 0.18(0.361)
Pseudo-R2 0.39 0.13 0.60 — 0.44 —
Method Logit OLogit(CS) Logit(Y) ReLogit OLS RC
Observations 1,125 136 4,429 1,125 1,125 1,125
C 138 136 131 138 138 138
Notes: prio25 throughout. p-values are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have 
been employed to compute z-statistics. OLogit(CS): cross-sectional data estimated using ordered logit. Logit(Y): 
yearly data estimated using Logit. ReLogit: Rare Events Logit estimator. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares in a linear 
probability model (LPM). RC: Random coef/cients in an LPM.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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a likelihood ratio test, we can indeed reject the hypothesis of constant coef/cients. 
Statistically, this is no surprise, as such a speci/cation across countries is often 
rejected anyway, though we return to this test below.39 Despite this, it is of interest 
that the estimates of the coef/cients in the OLS-LPM and RC speci/cations 
(see columns 5 and 6 of Table 8) are very similar—these coef/cients are compa-
rable since they’ve both been estimated in a linear speci/cation. That suggests that 
the qualitative and quantitative conclusions of the /rst part of the paper hold when 
the assumption of constancy of the coef/cients is dropped.
The goal of this section, then, is to construct and use country-by-country proxies 
for relative publicness and cohesion.
We /rst construct indicators for pi and $, and use these to de/ne a proxy for 
the relative publicness of the prize. Begin with the indicator for the private payoff 
$. It seems natural to associate $ with rents that are easily appropriable. Because 
appropriability is closely connected to the presence of resources, we approximate 
the degree of “privateness” in the prize by asking if the country is rich in natural 
resources. We proxy the abundance of natural resources by the per capita value of 
oil reserves (oilresv).40 Next, we create an index of “publicness” (pub) by ask-
ing different questions about the degree of power afforded to those who run the 
country, “more democratic” being regarded as correlated with “less power” and 
consequently a lower valuation of the public payoff to con.ict. We use four differ-
ent proxies to construct the index:41 (i) the lack of executive constraints (excons); 
(ii) the level of autocracy (autocr); (iii) the degree to which political rights are 
.outed (polrights); and (iv) the extent of suppression of civil liberties (civlib). 
Our variable pub is constructed by looking at binary versions of these outcomes and 
then averaging the indicators. Details are in the Appendix. The results are robust to 
different modes of construction and indeed to the choice of a subset of these mea-
sures; see the online Appendix for some variants.
Our proxy for the relative publicness of the prize is given by 
(5) Λ(γ ) ≡ (γ pub × gdppc)/(γ pub × gdppc + oilresv),
where we multiply the pub indicator by per capita GDP to convert the “poor governance” 
variables into monetary equivalents (note that oil reserves are expressed in money values 
per capita as well). The “conversion factor” γ makes the privateness and publicness vari-
ables comparable, and allows us to combine them to arrive at the ratio Λ(γ).
We take γ = 1 in the main text. The online Appendix shows that the results are 
robust to a wide range of values of γ. In addition, we can compute pseudo-likelihoods 
for different values of γ, just as we did for the linguistic distance coef/cient (see 
Figure 2). Figure 3 displays the likelihood results for the dependent variable prio25, 
39 The likelihood ratio test is made complicated by the fact that the constrained parameters being tested—the 
variances of the random coef/cients equal zero—lie on the boundary of the parameter space. A general distribution 
theory for this test is not available, but Stram and Lee (1994) show that the tail probabilities of the distribution of 
our test statistic are bounded above by those of the χ2 with the standard degrees of freedom, four in our case. The 
test thus provides a suf/cient condition for rejection using the χ2 (4) distribution.
40 Data on oil reserves comes from Haber and Menaldo (2011). See the Appendix for details on the construction 
of this variable.
41 As mentioned earlier, we use time-invariant versions of these variables since short-run changes are likely to be 
correlated with the incidence of con.ict.
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and for the two empirical speci/cations in Table 9 that use prio25. Clearly, γ = 1 is 
a good choice under this criterion.
Table 9, columns 1–3, provides a variety of different speci/cations using the binary 
variable prio25 as well as the multivalued indicators prioint and isc. Group cohe-
sion is held constant, and our main independent variables are P × Λ, F × (1 − Λ), 
and G/N × Λ, where Λ ≡ Λ(1). This allows us to test whether the interacted indi-
ces of ethnic inequality, fractionalization, and polarization are signi/cant. We also 
include the noninteracted indices in order to examine whether their signi/cance 
truly comes from the interaction term.42 Polarization interacted with Λ is positive 
and generally signi/cant, and the same is true of fractionalization interacted with 
1 − Λ. (The interacted Greenberg-Gini is not signi/cant.)
The level terms P, F, and G are now no longer signi/cant. Conditional on hav-
ing the true values of λ, this is precisely what the model would predict. After all, 
the in.uence of polarization (say) should be zero when there are no public goods, 
broadly de/ned to include primordial goals, at stake. The fact that our estimate Λ 
happens to achieve the same goal is of interest, and possibly suggests that factors 
such as pure primordialism have little to do with ethnic con.ict.
We remark on the interpretation of interactions in nonlinear regressions (such as the 
logit). It is well known that any signi/cance of an interaction term cannot be attributed 
fully to the true effect of that interaction term on the dependent variable (see, e.g., Ai 
and Norton 2003).43 It does imply, however, that the effect on the underlying latent 
variable—the cost of con.ict, as proxied by the number of deaths—is indeed as esti-
mated. And this is what we are interested in from the viewpoint of the theory.
Next, we allow group cohesion to vary across countries. We estimate a proxy A for 
the level of group cohesion α by exploiting the answers to a certain set of questions 
asked in the 2005 wave of the World Values Survey. We use the latest wave available 
because it covers the largest number of countries. One could argue that the answers 
might be conditioned by the existence of previous or contemporary con.ict. The 
42 We do not include the level of Λ—there is nothing to suggest that it will have a level effect—but rather the 
components of Λ, which are the oilresv indicator and the variable pub × gdppc constructed from the governance 
variables.
43 A linear probability model, though problematic on other grounds, would not exhibit this problem.
Figure 3. Pseudo-Likelihoods for Different Values of γ
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questions we have selected, described in detail in the Appendix, do not ask about 
speci/c groups, but address issues like adherence to social norms, identi/cation 
with the local community, the importance of helping others, and so on.44 We con-
struct a summary proxy for α—call it A—from the scores on these questions.
44 To be sure, even such a procedure is vulnerable to charges of endogeneity, but hopefully less so.
Table 9—Relative Publicness and Cohesion, Fearon Groupings
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P −3.31(0.424) −1.93(0.538) −9.21(0.561) −3.01(0.478) −1.65(0.630) −13.04(0.584)
F 0.73(0.209) 0.75(0.157) −2.27(0.249) 1.48(0.131) 1.51(0.108) −6.65**(0.047)
G/N −5.07(0.346) −4.61(0.352) 0.78(0.789) −3.78(0.767) 3.31(0.742) −71.03(0.214)
PΛ 17.38***(0.001) 13.53***(0.001) 60.23***(0.005)
— — —
F(1 − Λ)  2.53***(0.003)  1.92***(0.003) 11.87***(0.000)
— — —
(G/N)Λ  −0.72*(0.912) −1.37(0.823) −9.57(0.298)
— — —
PΛA — — — 23.25**(0.021) 19.16**(0.019) 72.22*(0.083)
F(1 − Λ)A — — — 4.02**(0.013) 2.92***(0.003) 26.03***(0.000)
(G/N)Λ(1 − A) — — — −2.31(0.981) −68.42(0.358) 579.24*(0.089)
gdppc −0.62***(0.000) −0.50***(0.000) −2.36***(0.000) −0.65***(0.000) −0.53***(0.003) −3.68***(0.000)
pop 0.10(0.267) 0.09(0.243) 0.99***(0.000) 0.08(0.622) 0.09(0.448) 0.33(0.565)
oilresv 0.00(0.986) 0.00(0.860) 0.00(0.277)  0.00**(0.017) 0.00***(0.006) 0.00(0.234)
mount  0.01*(0.059) 0.00(0.169)  0.04**(0.012)  0.02***(0.009)  0.01**(0.015)  0.06**(0.032)
ncont  0.87**(0.015) 0.41(0.173)  4.21***(0.005)  1.31***(0.002)  0.93***(0.007)  4.98***(0.008)
pubgdppc 0.00(0.397) 0.00(0.847) 0.00**(0.014)  0.00**(0.024)  0.00*(0.074) 0.00(0.214)
lag  2.62***(0.000)  1.93***(0.000)  0.47***(0.000)  2.40***(0.000) 1.79***(0.000)  0.42***(0.000)
const −0.01(0.995)
— −5.27(0.354) −0.43(0.900)
— 28.33*(0.072)
Pseudo-R2 0.40 0.34 0.42 0.48 0.39 0.41
Observations 1,104 1,104 1,090 447 447 443
C 138 138 138 53 53 53
DepVar. prio25 prio-int isc prio25 prio-int isc
Notes: Columns 1 and 4, logit; columns 2 and 5, ordered logit; columns 3 and 6, OLS; p-values are reported in 
parentheses. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have been employed to compute z-statistics.
*** Signi/cant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Signi/cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi/cant at the 10 percent level.
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Unfortunately, a signi/cant shortcoming of this approach is that the sample of 
countries even in the 2005 World Values Survey is limited. We are therefore restricted 
to only 447 observations, corresponding to 53 countries.
Columns 4–6 of Table 9 examine this variant. In this speci/cation the independent 
variables are exactly the ones posited by the model. We use precisely the combina-
tions asked for by the theory: polarization is weighted both by Λ and by A, fraction-
alization by (1 − Λ) and by A again, and so on. We continue to employ the direct 
terms P, F, and G, as well as the controls.45 The results continue to be quite striking. 
The composite terms for polarization and fractionalization are signi/cant. The lev-
els continue to be insigni/cant.
Finally, we test the hypothesis that now, with the interacted effects in place, the 
estimated coef/cients can be taken to be common across countries. We reestimate 
the regressions in Table 9 by allowing for random coef/cients in the interacted and 
noninteracted indices. This time, invoking the Stram-Lee test once again, we are 
unable to reject the hypothesis of constant coef/cients for columns 3 to 6.46 This is 
by no means conclusive, but it suggests that a fair amount of intercountry variation 
is indeed being picked up by the new speci/cations of Table 9.
We remind the reader that we have reported our results using the conversion factor 
γ = 1 to aggregate public and private prizes in equation (5). The online Appendix 
reports on several versions of Table 9, for different values of γ, and shows that our 
results are robust to these variations.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In a monumental treatise, Horowitz (1985, p. 92) observes of the second half of 
the twentieth century that “[i]n much of Asia and Africa, it is only modest hyperbole 
to assert that the Marxian prophecy has had an ethnic ful/llment.”
This is a remarkable assertion. The fundamental question of interest is whether 
ethnic “divisions” do matter for social con.ict. We’ve argued that such a question 
cannot be addressed properly unless we have theory to guide us on the empirical 
construction of an “ethnic division.” As Esteban and Ray (2011) show, the appropri-
ate choice of division depends on the nature of the con.ict—whether it is over pub-
lic or private goods—and the extent of cohesion within the groups that are engaged 
in con.ict. In particular, that paper links ethnic con.ict to a linear combination of 
ethnic polarization, ethnic fractionalization, and the Greenberg-Gini index of inter-
group differences. As we have discussed in some detail in the paper, the weights 
in that linear combination correspond to the relative importance of public and pri-
vate goods in the con.ict prize. Speci/cally, the impact of polarization increases 
with con.ict over public goods, while the impact of fractionalization increases with 
the private component of con.ict. The Esteban-Ray framework also tells us that 
the importance of the three indices depends on the extent of within-group cohe-
sion present in intergroup con.ict. (In particular, when there is no cohesion at all, 
the well-known free-rider problem dominates and all con.ict vanishes when the 
45 We feel no particular compunction to include all possible level effects. Terms such as P × Λ × A can be viewed 
as composite variables that the model predicts will matter, and not as interactions of (in this instance) three variables.
46 See Table 15 in the online Appendix and the discussion there.
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population is large.) The theoretical structure therefore both disciplines our empiri-
cal speci/cation and allows for interpretation of the estimated coef/cients.
The /rst task of this paper is to implement the above measures; speci/cally, those 
that employ intergroup “distances.” We do so using linguistic differences across 
groups, in the spirit of Fearon (2003a) and Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg 
(2012). Linguistic distance—as constructed by the cardinality of intervening nodes 
on the language tree—is plausibly exogenous to con.ict, while at the same time 
they can be expected to drive—or at least in.uence—antagonisms across groups.47
We then proceed to an empirical analysis that closely parallels the theory. Our main 
result is that ethnic polarization has a large and highly signi/cant impact on con.ict 
across a number of different speci/cations. By and large, though with somewhat lesser 
consistency, this is also true of fractionalization. These two /ndings suggest that public 
and private components of con.ict are generally both present, and that within-group 
cohesion is strong during con.ict.48 The numerical effects of the two measures are 
large and quite similar. For instance, moving polarization from the 20th percentile to 
the 80th percentile, holding all other variables at their means, approximately doubles 
the chances of con.ict, and the same is true of fractionalization.
Our results concerning polarization (and to a lesser degree, fractionalization) are 
highly robust. They extend to a variety of different measures of con.icts (including 
different binary measures of con.ict incidence, as well as continuous indices), to alter-
native ways of calculating language distances, to different choices of groups (as long 
as language is principally used in de/ning them), to the use of different regional dum-
mies or selections, and to the inclusion of overall or regional time trends.
A limitation of our cross-sectional approach is that the importance of public and 
private components of con.ict, as well as the extent of group cohesion, are presumed 
not to vary over countries. We therefore pursue re/nements of our speci/cation by 
constructing country-speci/c measures of “relative publicness” of the prize, using 
data on natural resources (as a proxy for private payoffs) and data on autocracy (as 
a proxy for public payoff to holding power). We combine these measures to create 
an index of “relative publicness” of con.ict payoffs, one that varies across countries. 
When our measures are interacted with this index in exactly the way suggested by 
the theory, the resulting coef/cients are signi/cant across a variety of speci/cations, 
and are strongly supportive of the conceptual framework.
The exercise can be augmented still further by using a measure for within-group 
cohesion, one that we construct by using information from the World Values Survey. 
We can then directly address the model by imposing even more structure, by con-
structing variables that conform precisely to those predicted by the theory. The result-
ing outcomes, both for polarization and fractionalization, are highly signi/cant.
This paper takes a step toward the establishment of a strong empirical relation-
ship between con.ict and certain indicators of ethnic group distribution, one that is 
47 Another possibility, infeasible at present, is to use measures of genetic distance across groups. This is not hard 
to do across countries, but at this time there is too little within-country variation. In those cases in which more disag-
gregated data is available (see Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 1994), it has been prohibitively dif/cult to obtain 
group share data. Perhaps in the near future, with more detailed genetic datasets, this approach will become feasible.
48 The Greenberg-Gini index (normalized by population, as required by the theory) is also signi/cant in several 
of the speci/cations, but usually with a negative sign. This /nding supports our conclusion that group cohesion is 
extremely important and present to a signi/cant degree in times of con.ict. Presumably, the very fact that a con.ict 
is observed implies that free-rider problems have been overcome to a large extent.
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/rmly grounded in theory. Observe that in no case do we use income-based groups 
or income-based measures, and in this sense our study is perfectly orthogonal to 
those that attempt to /nd a relationship between economic inequality and con.ict. 
At the same time, as we have argued in this paper, this is not to say that con.ict is 
fundamentally noneconomic. It could be. But there is an equal possibility that the 
economics of con.ict /nds expression across groups that are demarcated on other 
grounds: religion, caste, geography, or language. Such markers can pro/tably be 
exploited for economic and political ends, even when the markers themselves have 
nothing to do with economics. A more nuanced study of the relative importance of 
economic versus primordial antagonisms must await future research, however.
Appendix
We provide de/nitions of all major variables used in the paper, beginning with the 
different measures of con.ict.
prio25. “Armed con.ict” from PRIO: a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of 
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths per year and per incompatibility. We consider only types 3 and 4 from the 
database; these refer to internal armed con.ict. If a country has experienced a prio25 
con.ict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our /ve-year period, 
this variable takes a value equal to 1.
priocw. “Intermediate armed con.ict” from PRIO: includes all prio25 con.icts 
that result in a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the con.ict. We consider 
only types 3 and 4 (internal armed con.ict). If a country has experienced a priocw 
con.ict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our /ve-year period, 
this variable takes a value equal to 1.
prio1000. “War” from PRIO: same de/nition as prio25 with a threshold of battle-
related deaths of at least 1,000 per year and per incompatibility. We consider only 
types 3 and 4 (internal armed con.ict). If a country has experienced a prio1000 
con.ict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our /ve-year period, 
this variable takes a value equal to 1.
prioint. “Con.ict intensity” from PRIO: we assign a value of 0 if there is peace in 
a given year, a value of 1 if there are events satisfying prio25 that are not prio1000, 
and a value of 2 if there are events recorded as prio1000. The value of prioint is the 
maximum con.ict level experienced within the /ve-year period.
isc. Index of social con.ict. The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive 
(CNTS) computes the isc index as the weighted average of eight variables related 
to social unrest.49
49 These variables are (weights are provided in brackets): Assassinations (domestic1) [25]: Any politically moti-
vated murder or attempted murder of a high government of/cial or politician. General Strikes (domestic2) [20]: 
Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed 
at national government policies or authority. Guerrilla Warfare (domestic3) [100]: Any armed activity, sabotage, or 
bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the pres-
ent regime. Major Government Crises (domestic4) [20]: Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring 
the downfall of the present regime, excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow. Purges (domestic5) [20]: Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or 
the opposition. Riots (domestic6) [25]: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving 
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Next, we de/ne the three main distributional measures that we use.
F. Fractionalization, de/ned as F =  ∑ i=1 m  n i (1 −  n i ), where  n i is the population 
share of group i and m is the number of groups. Data on group shares has been obtained 
from Fearon (2003b) and the Ethnologue project (http://www.ethnolgue.com).
P. Polarization, computed as P =  ∑ i=1 m  ∑ j=1 m  n i 2 n j κ ij , where  κ ij = 1 −  s ij 0.05 and 
s ij is the degree of similarity between two languages i and j, given by the ratio of the 
number of common branches to the maximum possible number—15 for the entire 
tree.50 Group shares are constructed as above, for F; data on language and linguistic 
distances come from Ethnologue.
G. Greenberg-Gini index, de/ned as G =  ∑ i=1 m  ∑ j=1 m  n i  n j  κ ij . We use the same 
data sources as for P.
R. Binary-distance polarization measure, de/ned as R =  ∑ i=1 m  n i 2 (1 −  n i ). We 
use the same data sources as for F.
Finally, we record the other variables and controls in alphabetical order.
A. A variable for group cohesion, constructed from the 2005 wave of the World 
Values Survey. For each individual, we compute the simple average of the scores to 
a set of questions related to group commitment and adhesion to social norms.51 The 
country estimate is the average of the individual averages.
autocr. Institutionalized autocracy. The data source is Polity IV (2011) and takes 
values on a 0–10 scale, with 10 signifying extreme autocracy. We transform this 
variable into a time-invariant dummy in the following way: /rst, the percentage of 
years in the sample for which a country received a score lower than /ve was calcu-
lated. Then, if this percentage was lower than 40 percent, a country received a time-
invariant 1 for this nonautocracy dummy and 0 otherwise.
civlib. (Lack of) civil liberties. Data source is Freedom House (2011), which con-
siders a 1–7 scale (1 indicates highest level of liberties). We transform this variable 
into a time-invariant dummy in the following way: /rst, the percentage of years in the 
sample for which a country received a score smaller than four was calculated. Then, 
if this percentage was smaller than 40 percent, a country received a value of 1 in all 
the sample.
democ. Institutionalized democracy. Data source is Polity IV (2011). Democracy 
ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). As in MRQ, democ takes a value equal to 1 if the 
score is higher than or equal to 4 and 0 otherwise.
excons. (Lack of) executive constraints. It is de/ned on a 1–7 scale (1 indicates 
minimum constraints); source is Polity IV (2011). We transform this variable into 
the use of physical force. Revolutions (domestic7) [150]: Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, 
any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from 
the central government. Antigovernment Demonstrations (domestic8) [10]: Any peaceful public gathering of at least 
100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, 
excluding demonstrations of a distinctly antiforeign nature. The calculation of the isc is performed as follows: 
weighted sum of occurrences of each event divided by the number of types of variables, 8.
50 If two groups speak the same language,  s ij is set to 1.
51 These questions are: V84: “It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-
being.” V87: “It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is 
wrong.” V89: “Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or fam-
ily.” V7: “For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is: Politics.” V9: “For 
each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life: Religion.” V211: “People have different views about 
themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?: I see myself as part of my local community.” 
All variables are normalized to a 1–4 scale.
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a time-invariant dummy in the following way: /rst, the percentage of years in the 
sample for which a country received a score greater than four is computed. Then, if 
this percentage is smaller than 0.4, a country received a value of excons equal to 1 in 
all the sample.
gdppc. Log of real GDP per capita corresponding to the /rst year of each /ve-year 
period. Source: Maddison (2008).
mount. Percent mountainous terrain. The data source is Fearon and Laitin 
(2003b), who use the codings of geographer A. J. Gerard.
N. Population, in millions. Source: Maddison (2011).
ncont. Noncontiguous states, referring to countries with territory holding at least 
10,000 people and separated from the land area containing the capital city either by 
land or by 100 kilometers of water. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003b).
oil/diam. Oil/Diamond dummy, which takes the value 1 if the country is “rich in 
oil” or produces (any positive quantity of) diamonds. A country is “rich in oil” if the 
average value of its oil production in a period is larger than 100 US dollars in 2000 
constant dollars. Source: Ross (2011).
oilresv. Per capita value of oil reserves at the beginning of the period. Data for 
oil reserves comes from Haber and Menaldo (2011). To convert quantities into dol-
lars, we use the oil price data in Ross (2006), where prices are referred to the same 
year as reserves. Finally, we divide by population to obtain a per capita measure.
Table 10—Summary Statistics
Con.ict variables Mean SD
prio25 0.231 0.422
priocw 0.156 0.363
prio1000 0.090 0.286
prioint 0.321 0.631
isc 9.317 14.436
Ethnolinguistic indices Mean SD
 P δ=0.05 (Fearon) 0.046 0.054
G/ N δ=0.05 Fearon 0.044 0.129
F (Fearon) 0.417 0.245
R (Fearon) 0.123 0.063
 P δ=0.05 (ETH) 0.043 0.048
G/ N δ=0.05 (ETH) 0.110 0.365
F (ETH) 0.451 0.319
R (ETH) 0.107 0.066
Other variables Mean SD
gdppc 7.985 1.111
pop 15.721 1.807
mount 15.518 19.853
ncont 0.146 0.353
dem 0.472 0.499
oil/Diam 0.316 0.465
oilresv 23,960.400 170,898.700
pub 0.446 0.445
excons 0.536 0.498
autocr 0.371 0.483
polrights 0.459 0.499
civlib 0.475 0.500
Λ 0.565 0.408
A 0.729 0.073
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polrights. (Lack of) political rights. The data source is Freedom House (2011), 
which considers a 1–7 scale (1 indicates most free). We transform this variable into 
a time-invariant dummy in the following way: /rst, the percentage of years in the 
sample for which a country received a score smaller than four was calculated. Then, 
if this percentage was smaller than 40 percent, a country received a value of 1 in all 
the sample.
pop. Log of population in the /rst year of each /ve-year period. Source: Maddison 
(2008).
pub. Publicness index. It is de/ned as the simple average of excons, autocr, 
polrights, and civlib.
Λ. Relative publicness of the prize, de/ned as Λ = pub/(pub + oilresv/gdp). It 
corresponds to Λ(γ) in the text when the conversion factor γ is set equal to 1.
Table 10 presents the mean and the standard deviation of all the variables employed 
in the empirical analysis.
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